[dropcap]S[/dropcap]peaking when he witnessed the much-delayed distribution of fertiliser to small-scale farmers in Chongwe, Agriculture Minister Mtolo Phiri directed police to arrest anyone involved in the selling of fertiliser meant for farmers under the Farmers Input Support Programme (FISP).
Mr Phiri added that Government was aware of individuals who were taking advantage of the much-delayed distribution exercise and selling fertiliser meant for small-scale farmers. He warned that the law would not spare anyone involved in such illegalities regardless of their political affiliation or position in society.
As if Zambia did not have enough to worry about. There has recently been the problem of confusion caused by the conflicting statements being issued by Government officials surrounding this year’s FISP and the nation’s consequent widespread disenchanted feeling.
As a possible consequence the year 2023 would be a difficult one as majority of Zambians would be at risk of facing starvation due to the mishandling of the fertiliser distribution and other farming inputs for the 2022/2023 farming season.
To make matters worse, farmers on the Copperbelt appealed to the government to urgently address the shortage of maize seed that hit the province. The situation caused panic among farmers who were not on the government-funded FISP.
Some farmers who were not on FISP, lamented that they were worried that they may not be able to access the essential commodity in time to plant for the current farming season. They revealed that since farmers relied on maize for consumption, government should urgently intervene in the matter for the province to have enough maize for consumption next year.
And some farmers on FISP also complained that they would have nowhere to get the seed if the situation continued. But when contacted, Zambia Agro-Dealers Association (ZADA) officials disclosed that the status quo was due to the removal of agro-dealers from FISP by the government.
Not only that, ZADA officials also revealed that the agro-dealers moreover had no capital to source seed from alternative sources to stock their shops, since what the government still owed them, formed part of the country’s outstanding US$13 billion domestic debt.
They added that the seed was there but agro-dealers had no access to the seed because they were removed from FISP and the other thing was that some had not been paid, as a result, they had no resources to run their businesses. Consequently, they were appealing to government to look into their matter.
They also disclosed that agro-dealers hoped that government would put them back on FISP next year, so that they could be back in business.
Meanwhile, debt-affected agro-dealers’ only hope of getting paid by the government possibly is after completion of the country’s much-delayed debt restructuring negotiations with external creditors under the IMF-prescribed G-20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments, allowing the country’s unsustainable domestic debt to be concurrently treated as well.
Keen observers’ accounts described how farmers across the country were certainly preoccupied with how and where they were going to buy agricultural inputs.
Some farmers who were eligible for FISP and the Food Security Pack programme under the Ministry of Community Development and Social were probably fulfilling their obligation to access the inputs.
Those who were not eligible and even those whose input needs were beyond what was provided for through FISP were certainly looking for alternative and cheaper sources. However, for criminal-minded individuals, the much-delayed fertiliser distribution period of inputs presented an opportune time for them to extract money from unsuspecting farmers by selling fake inputs.
Clearly though, fraudsters took advantage of this period to package fake seeds, fertiliser and other inputs to sell to unsuspecting farmers at ridiculously low prices.
Due to the enticingly low prices at which those fake inputs were sold, many farmers fell for them. Inevitably, those fake seeds would obviously result into low or no yields at all.
At a time that Zambians were grappling with climate change, which had previously affected yields and food security, the issue of planting substandard seed had other implication – particularly for small-scale farmers.
After all, somebody had to be blamed for the late distribution of inputs and subsequent low yields in the 2022/2023 farming season. Farmers needed to be alert as they went about buying their inputs to avoid falling victim to fraudsters.
Hence small-scale farmers in particular should desist from buying seeds on the streets or unlicensed seed traders to curtail losses. When buying maize seed, a farmer should ensure that the bag of seed has a label from the Seed Certification Control Institute of Zambia (SCCIZ).
The label should have the date on which the seed was tested by SCCIZ. The lot number on the label shows the year the seed was produced and the grower.
The label further indicates the germination capacity and purity of the seed, which is normally above 90 percent. Farmers also need to understand that each seed company uses a different colourant that is mixed with seeds to protect seeds against pests. The colourant contains the shiny substance that makes certified seeds look different from substandard seeds.
Cleary. it could have been a lot worse. Nevertheless the UPND’s stay in government so far has been characterised by failure to provide adequate fertiliser and other farming inputs on time which would have far reaching consequences.
With collaborative relations between the government and agro-dealers frayed, the worry is that Public-Private Partnership’s agricultural investment could taper off, thus dampening socio-economic transformation.
But while right now the government might have gro-dealers seemingly stuck in limbo, it wouldn’t have forgotten that agro-dealers represented Zambia’s countrywide distribution and retail networks of farming inputs.
Undeniably though, the erstwhile collaborative partners symbiotically needed each other. Perhaps a little government’s cajoling rather than coercing is to follow. Despite all this, final analysis of FISP policy failures is, by definition, not a neutral endeavour, since policy fiascos are not neutral events.
Moreover, they are often, usually implicitly, but sometimes explicitly, permeated with prosecutorial narratives, blame games and a search for culprits of unintended consequences. So then, what happens next to FISP policy implementers?
